I. INTRODUCTION
National health expenditures in the United States are projected to exceed $3.093 trillion in 2014. 1 Prescription drug sales accounted for 8.9% of all national health expenditures in 2013. 2 In 2014, these drug sales are projected to exceed $275.9 billion of national health expenditures. 3 The significant pharmaceutical drug sales are due, in large part, to the increasing commonality of treatment; in 2013, nearly seven in ten Americans took prescription drugs for treatment. 4 Most pharmaceutical drugs brought to market are subject to patent protection.
This limited protection provides incentives for drug development and research. However, following patent expiration it is common that brand-name drugs lose their market share to generic alternatives. 5 These generic drugs provide more affordable 1 National Health Expenditure Projections 2012-2022, CENTER FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, http://www.cms.gov/ResearchStatistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-andReports/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/proj2012.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 2015) . 2 Id. 3 Id. 4 The most common prescription drugs taken were antibiotics, antiasthmas, painkillers, and antidepressants. Nearly 7 in 10 Americans Take Prescription Drugs, Mayo Clinic, Olmstead Medical Center Find, MAYO CLINIC (June 19, 2013), http://newsnetwork.mayoclinic.org/ discussion/nearly-7-in-10-americans-take-prescription-drugs-mayoclinic-olmsted-medical-center-find [hereinafter Nearly 7 in 10 Americans]. 5 A "generic" drug in this Note refers to pharmaceutical equivalents of brand-name FDA approved drugs that exist post patent-expiration. treatment options versus their brand-name counterparts. 6 The savings of switching to generic drugs can be significant; for example, opting for generic drugs versus their brandname counterparts saved consumers an estimated $33 billion in 2013. 7 External forces are known to influence consumer choices for prescription filing 8 and an estimated 90% of prescription drugs written in 2007 were generic. 9 The U.S. Constitution plays an important role of safeguarding fundamental interests of citizens.
It establishes "a system of dual sovereignty between the States and the Federal Government." 10 As it relates to the pharmaceutical industry, this dual sovereignty allows the federal and state government the ability to enact protection laws for its citizens. Thus, the Constitution grants states the power to enact laws subject to the Supremacy Clause.. 11 States have enacted tort laws that provide protection to its citizens. In the pharmaceutical industry, state tort laws "uncover unknown drug hazards and provide incentives for drug manufacturers to disclose safety risks promptly. These state tort laws also provide (sometimes limited) compensation to injured parties in an attempt to redress injuries. 13 Additionally, these tort laws help to supplement gaps present in federal law, such as the lack of a private cause of action in the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA"). 14 The long held constitutional right of permitting tort law causes of action for injured parties might no longer be available to generic drug consumers. Two recently decided Supreme Court cases have established precedent holding that while brand name drug manufacturers face liability for failure-to-warn and product liability claims, generic drug manufacturers will not face liability so long as it complies with the duty of sameness as defined in the FDCA. 15 This precedent is preventing innocently injured consumers from being able to seek legal recourse against liable generic drug manufacturers.
Addressing this issue or providing alternative legal courses remains paramount to protect consumer needs.
A. Issue
The two decisions issued by the Supreme Court will have debilitating effects on generic drug consumers in the U.S. marketplace. This precedent is likely to result in denying individuals who take generic drugs the ability to legally redress their injuries. This is significant because an estimated 80% of consumers opt for generic drug treatment.
In PLIVA v. Mensing, the Court expanded the scope of the impossibility preemption. 16 This expansion granted immunity to generic drug manufacturers from state law failure-to-warn claims. 17 In PLIVA, two individuals that had developed tardive dyskinesia, a severe abnormal and 13 Bartlett. 27 To facilitate an understanding of the issue discussed, Section II explains the statutory history of both patent law and federal regulations applicable to generic and brand name pharmaceutical manufacturers. Section II will also discuss the procedural and regulatory thresholds that generic drug manufacturers are required to satisfy to bring its drugs to market. Section III will explore the preemption doctrine, delving into potential preemption scenarios that may arise as a legal argument. Section IV will analyze these three Supreme Court cases and it will apply this flawed precedent to Indiana by applying this precedent to previously decided Indiana cases. Finally, Section IV will explore possible options available to injured generic drug consumers.
II. THE LAW AND REGULATORY RULES OF THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
To understand the statutory structure of pharmaceutical law and market entry barriers pharmaceutical drugs face, it is important to understand the reasoning underlying the creation of the acts themselves.
This section briefly explores U.S. patent law as it relates to generic and brand name drugs, it provides a brief history of acts relevant to the pharmaceutical industry, and it explores the barriers to entry applicable to brand name and generic drug manufacturers.
A. Historical Background
Patent Law
The original article of the Constitution provides the origin of patent protection. 28 Patents play a central role in 25 ( The Bolar exemption also allows generic drug manufacturers to perform research and tests in preparation for regulatory approval prior to patent expiration, and this exemption immunizes the generic manufacturers against patent infringement suits. The rationale is for the Bolar exemption is to allow generic drug manufacturers the opportunity to conduct clinical trials on patented products before the products patent has expired). There are other exceptions and protections granted to generic drug manufacturers. For example, a paragraph 4 (often referred to as P4) certification is a form that generic firms can use to challenge current patents. If the brand-name manufacturer sues the generic filing P4 party, and it is determined that the patent is indeed invalid, the generic manufacturer is rewarded with a valuable 180-day marketing exclusivity period. The P4's origin traces back to the Hatch-Waxman Act. 33 34 For a patent to be held valid, there are many requirements. Generally, the patent must be novel, useful, and non-obvious to a person ordinarily skilled in the art. 35 The patent subject matter must also be patentable 36 and specified written materials must be part of every patent application. 37 The original patent holder may be able to file for an extension on their monopoly powers. These extensions are subject to their own onerous requirements. Following the expiration of the patent term, whether or not an extension has been granted, generic drug manufacturers are able to Writings The origin of regulations for health consumer goods was created in 1906. The 1906 passage of the Pure Food and Drugs Act ("PFDA") began the FDA's origin as a federal consumer protection agency. 39 The FDA's responsibilities have been amended since the initial passage of the PFDA and the FDA's current responsibilities in the pharmaceutical industry involve overseeing drug approval and post approval safety. 40 The FDA acts as a gatekeeper and the agency plays an important role in pharmaceutical regulation. 41 Prior to the PFDA, the "[u]se of chemical preservatives . . . was virtually uncontrolled." 42 Manufacturers were not subject to any approval process and could freely enter the market and sell drugs. The PFDA passage 43 41 Steele, supra note 7 at 469 (The United State Government and Accountability Office ("GAO") has raised concerns over the FDA's "management of safety issues for drugs approved for marketing." The FDA staff has "expressed concern about their ability to meet a growing post market workload, with some maintaining that their premarket responsibilities are considered a higher priority." (Citations omitted)). the uncontrolled industry by prohibiting the manufacturing or interstate shipment of adulterated or misbranded drugs. The PFDA also helped by supplementing consumer protections already provided by state regulation and common law liability. 44 After expressing concern about unsafe drugs and fraudulent marketing, Congress enacted the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA"). 45 This required the premarket approval of new drugs by requiring every drug manufacturer to submit a new drug application ("NDA"), including all reports and investigations, to the FDA for review. 46 Congress amended the FDCA in 1962. 47 This amendment shifted the burden of proof from the FDA to the manufacturer to gain drug approval. This amendment also requires manufacturers to prove a drug's effectiveness by introducing "substantial evidence . . . that the drug will have the effect it purports or is represented to have under the conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the proposed labeling." 48 Furthermore, this amendment added a clause stating that state law would be invalidated only upon a "direct and positive conflict" with the FDCA. 49 This clause remains important to current preemption analysis and it will be analyzed in depth below.
Congress sought to facilitate the quicker approval of generic drugs into the marketplace. To streamline the generic drug approval process, Congress enacted the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act in 1984 (hereinafter the "Hatch-Waxman Act"). 50 Prior to enacting the Hatch-Waxman Act, generic drug manufacturers were required to undertake the same approval as brand name 44 Id. 56 The Hatch-Waxman Act's ANDA process allowed generic drug manufacturers to enter the marketplace without the restraints new brand name drug manufacturers face. As such, it was not long before generic drugs comprised the majority of the market. Generic drug approval costs dropped substantially due to the ANDA process. 57 As a result, the generic drug approval applications and sales steadily increased. Currently, 90% of drug prescriptions are filled with generic counterparts. 58 The most recent FDCA amendment relating to pharmaceuticals was passed in 2007 when Congress "adopted a rule of construction to make it clear that manufacturers remain responsible for updating their labels." 59 The Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act ("FDAAA") increased the burden placed on drug manufacturers. 60 Importantly, the FDA granted statutory authority under the FDAAA (and other parts of the FDCA) allowing it to require drug manufacturers to change drug labels based upon information discovered after a drug has been approved for market. 61 That is because manufacturers 55 Id. (Noting that this act "[a]wards brand manufacturers and innovators 12 years of data exclusivity from the approval date of the product." This will essentially expand the viable monopoly sale time of the brand-name biologic by preventing generic companies from relying on their previous research). 56 How Increased Competition has Affected Prices and Returns, supra note 35. 57 Steele, supra note 7 at 451 (Noting that "the average cost of bringing a generic to market is under $2 million, less than a quarter of the average costs associated with novel drugs."). 58 Steele, supra note 7 at 442. who have greater "access to information about their drugs" than the FDA retain the ultimate responsibility for the safety of their products. 62 Therefore, this requirement would place the burden on drug manufacturers and it provides incentives for manufacturers to provide wholly accurate and timely updates because it is their potential liability for failing to do so.
B. Current Regulatory Laws Affecting Pharmaceutical Drugs
Under current law, if a generic drug is identical to an FDA approved brand-name drug in several aspects, it may be approved without the same onerous requirements of brand-name drugs. 63 First, the proposed generic drug must be chemically equivalent to the approved brand-name drug. 64 This requires the generic drug to have the same "active ingredient" or "active ingredients," "route of administration," "dosage form," and "strength" as the approved brand-name drug. 65 Second, the generic drug must be "bioequivalent" to the approved brand-name drug. 66 To be considered bioequivalent, a generic drug has to have the same "rate and extent of absorption . . ." as its brandname counterpart. 67 Third, generic drug manufacturers must show that the "labeling proposed for the new drug is the same as the labeling approved for the listed drug . . . ." 68 This labeling requirement has been argued (and interpreted) as meaning generic drug manufacturers are not able to unilaterally change their labels to strengthen warnings. 69 The FDA approves generic drugs only if they are determined "safe for use" under "conditions of use In an attempt to continually promote drug efficacy and safety, both ANDA's and NDA's are required by federal regulations to comply with reporting and monitoring requirements regarding drug safety. 74 Failure to comply with these regulations by establishing and maintaining records may result in the FDA "withdraw[ing] approval of the application and, thus, prohibit[ing] continued marketing of the drug product that is the subject of the application." 75 Furthermore, to facilitate consumer safety, drug manufacturers may "add or strengthen a contraindication, warning, precaution, or adverse reaction . . ." without prior approval so long as they notify the FDA thirty days prior to drug distribution. 76 It would appear that the previous responsibility would hold generic drug manufacturers liable for failing to update their labels. However, as discussed below, the duty of sameness absolves generic drug manufacturers of liability. In circumstances where the Supremacy Clause is applicable, the state law that conflicts with the federal law is generally "without effect." 79 Federal preemption is often divided into two categories: express preemption and implied preemption. 80 Express preemption exists when there is an explicit statutory provision stating that federal law will supersede law. 81 Therefore, when an explicit statutory provision exists stating federal law supersedes all other laws, the general inquiry is whether the state law falls with the scope of the federal law. 82 This section will explore the three recently decide Supreme Cases relevant to the preemption inquiry. This section will then continue by exploring Indiana law as it relates to this precedent and it will demonstrate how previously decided cases would likely result in unjust and inequitable decisions following the Court's precedent. Finally, this section will explore alternative options available for generic drug consumers to protect themselves.
A. Wyeth, Pliva and Bartlett
Wyeth -No State Tort Law Preemption from FDA's Brand-Name Drug Regulations
The first of the three Supreme Court cases involved a plaintiff that brought suit against a brand-name drug manufacturer on a failure-to-warn claim. 100 In Wyeth v. Levine, respondent Diana Levine suffered injuries from an IV-push injection of Phenergan. 101 As a result from such injuries, Ms. Levine was required to have her right hand and forearm amputated. 102 Ms. Levine suffered substantial medical expenses and the loss of her livelihood as professional musician. 103 In their decision, the jury found Wyeth negligent and concluded that Phenergan was a defective product that had inadequate warnings and instructions. 104 Specifically, the instructions had failed to "instruct clinicians to use the IV-drip method of intravenous 99 Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 581 (2009). 100 Id. at 560. 101 Id. 102 Id. at 559. 103 Id. 104 Id. at 562. administration instead of the higher risk IV-push method" that was used on Ms. Levine. 105 The drug manufacturer claimed impossibility preemption in the appeal. 106 The manufacturer argued it was impossible to comply with the state-law duty to modify Phenergan's label because federal law prohibited the unilateral change of a drugs label. 107 In dispensing with this argument, the Court reasoned the manufacturer failed to demonstrate it was impossible to comply with both federal and state law. 108 Under the Court's analysis, the Changes Being Effected ("CBE") regulation allowed manufacturers to supplement and change their label. 109 This "permitted Wyeth to unilaterally strengthen its warning, and the mere fact that the FDA approved Phenergan's label [did] not establish that it would have prohibited such a change." 110 In the concurrence, Justice Breyer stated the Court had "no occasion in this case to consider the pre-emptive effect of a specific agency regulation being the force of law." 111 He continued by reasoning that federal statutes and regulations neither protected the manufacturer from the risk of state-law liability nor prohibited the stronger warning label required by the state Court's judgment. 112 Comparatively, in another concurrence, Justice Thomas concluded that with no "direct conflict" between the federal and state law, the state-law judgment was not preempted. 113 preemption. This presumption would be discarded less than two years later in a subsequent Supreme Court decision.
PLIVA -State Tort Law Preemption for Failure-toWarn Claims Against Generic Manufacturers
The Court in Pliva v. Mensing went directly against the reasoning and holding in Wyeth. In Pliva v. Mensing, the Court expanded the scope of the impossibility preemption, which resulted in granting immunity to generic drug manufacturers in state-law failure-to-warn claims. 114 Two separate suits were consolidated into one lawsuit and the drug at issue was a generic equivalent, not the brand-name drug. 115 Both plaintiffs had been prescribed metoclopramide -a generic version of the drug Reglan -to treat their digestive tract problems. 116 After taking the generic drug for several years, both plaintiffs developed tardive dyskinesia, a disorder of involuntary bodily movements. 117 The plaintiffs argued the generic drug manufacturer was liable for failing to provide adequate warning labels, as required by state law. 118 The plaintiffs also argued that the CBE process explicitly permitted manufacturers to change their labels when additional information is available. 119 The CBE process permits drug manufacturers to "add or strengthen" its labels. 120 The FDA told the Court that label strengthening by a generic drug manufacturer is permissible only if the generic drug manufacturer sought to change the label to match that of an updated brand-name drug. 121 The FDA continued by arguing its interpretation was not determined to be "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation." 122 the Court to hold the manufacturer to the "duty of sameness" standard and to not permit the unilateral label change under the CBE process. 123 The generic drug manufacturer argued that FDA regulations and federal statute preempted state law tort claims because the federal "duty of sameness" required the same labeling for their generic drug metoclopramide 124 as the non-generic drug Reglan had. 125 The Court agreed and found that impossibility preemption was present because the state law required the generic manufacturer to change the drug label in a way to make it reasonably safe while the FDA regulation explicitly prevented generic drug manufacturers from independently changing their generic drug safety labels. 126 Therefore, as pointed out in Justice Sotomayor's dissent, the majority assumed that generic drug manufacturers "read the FDA regulation to require them only to ensure that their labels match the brand-name labels." 127 Under current law, a drug's "labeling must be revised to include a warning about a clinically significant hazard as soon as there is reasonable evidence of a causal association with a drug; a causal relationship need not have been definitely established." 128 However, the court did not address the issue of whether the generic drug manufacturer had a duty to request a strengthened label from the FDA; " [b] Generic drug manufacturers should not be permitted to "sustain their burden of showing impossibility if they have not even attempted to employ that mechanism." 131 A generic drug manufacturer should have the burden to propose label changes to the FDA, and in the event such proposal is denied, then it would be possible for impossibility preemption to exist. 132 As such, generic drug manufacturers should not be granted preemption protection without even attempting to propose change. As a result of the Court's decision in Pliva, generic drug consumers have no legal recourse against generic drug manufacturers who fail to update their labels. Consequently, generic drug manufacturers no longer will "monitor and disclose safety risks" they find as they will be able to rely solely on brandname manufacturer label changes or being immune through the preemption doctrine. 133 Currently 90% of consumers opt for generic drug alternatives, and under this dangerous precedent, many consumers may not have modes of relief for injuries against generic drug manufacturers. 134 It was not impossible for the generic drug manufacturer to comply with federal and state law in Pliva. The manufacturer could have approached the FDA and the agency may well have agreed that a change to the label was necessary. 135 New Hampshire courts employ a "risk-utility approach" in the design-defect analysis. 153 New Hampshire courts ask whether "magnitude of the danger outweighs the utility of the product." 154 Generally, New Hampshire courts consider three main factors, although such are non-exhaustive, which include: "[1] the usefulness and desirability of the product to the public as a whole, [2] whether the risk of danger could have been reduced without significantly affecting either the product's effectiveness or manufacturing cost, and [3] the presence and efficacy of a warning to avoid an unreasonable risk of harm from hidden dangers or from foreseeable uses." 155 The Supreme Court reasoned in their decision that increasing Sulindac's "usefulness" or reducing its "risk of danger" was not possible because the FDCA explicitly requires generic drugs to have the same active ingredients 156 and because the simple composition of Sulindac prevented it from being redesigned. 157 The Court further reasoned that strengthening Sulindac's warning label was Mutual Pharmaceutical's only way to minimize its "risk-utility" profile. 158 Therefore, because Mutual Pharmaceutical was not permitted to strengthen their label, 150 Id. 151 The Court's holding presupposes that drug manufacturers have a right to continue to sell drugs free of liability once approval has been given. 160 However, rejecting impossibility preemption here would not render preemption a "dead letter" 161 because Mutual Pharmaceutical was not legally obligated by New Hampshire's design-defect law to modify its label in a way that federal law prohibits. 162 Under applicable New Hampshire law, an unreasonably dangerous drug manufacturer has several options: "it can change the drug's design or label . . . to alter its risk-benefit profile, remove the drug from the market, or pay compensation as a cost of doing business." 163 Therefore, New Hampshire law allowed this manufacturer to either remove Sulindac from the market or pay compensation to the injured party as a result of the injury. 164 New Hampshire's design-defect law did not explicitly require Mutual to change the label for Sulindac and it did not mandate a change to Sulindac's design. 165 Rather, under New Hampshire law, the warning label is one factor in a non-exhaustive list. 166 The applicable New Hampshire law required nothing more than compensating an individual who was determined by a jury to have been injured by an "unreasonably dangerous drug." 167 As the district court made clear, Mutual was held liable for failing to adequately label Sulindac so that it was not "unreasonably dangerous," not for "failing to change" its warning. 168 New Hampshire sought to facilitate federal statutes by providing legal protection to its residents. Providing such legal protection 159 Id. at 2476-77. 160 Id. at 2491-92 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 161 Id. at 2492. 162 Id. 163 Id. at 2491. 164 Id. 165 Id. at 2487 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 166 See id. at 2475. 167 Id. at 2489 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 168 Bartlett) posed an obstacle to statutory objectives, it surely would have enacted express preemption provisions at some point during the FDCA's seventy-year history. Congress had the opportunity to explicitly apply the preemption doctrine to pharmaceuticals, yet it declined to do so and only applied it to medical devices. 171 Congress has never explicitly preempted state law tort claims against drug manufacturers. 172 While it is possible the Court's "statement that tort remedies and direct regulation do 'the same thing' may fade away when the Court again is presented with the issue and has the opportunity to treat it with more care[,] " 173 irreparable harm will likely occur if this issue is not addressed sooner.
B. Indiana's Statutory Analysis and the Importance of State Law
State tort law causes-of-action provide remedies to individuals harmed by the negligent acts of others. Tort laws play an important role in filling gaps in federal law and in discovering risks and "in providing incentives for manufacturers to remove dangerous products from the market promptly." 174 Indiana law is similar to New Hampshire law in that it provides residents with state law causes-of-action. 178 Under design-defect law in Indiana, a product may be defective through manufacturing flaws, defective design, or by a failure to supply complete information about the product's dangers. 179 To establish a prima facie case of strict liability in Indiana, the plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the following: "(1) the product is defective and unreasonably dangerous, (2) the defective condition existed at the time the product left defendant's control, and (3) the defective condition was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries." 180 A product liability action based on the doctrine of strict liability may not be maintained against a seller unless the seller is a "manufacturer of the product or of the part of the product alleged to be defective." 181 Whether a product is in an unreasonably dangerous and defective condition is a question of fact. 182 Indiana requires that the plaintiff show that a product is in a "defective condition" and also that it is "unreasonably dangerous." 183 An objective inquiry is required to determine whether a product is defective or unreasonably dangerous. This inquiry focuses on the product and its manufacturer or seller assessed by an objective standard regarding expected use. 184 The "unreasonably dangerous" requirement "refers to any situation in which the use of a product exposes the user or consumer to a risk of physical harm to an extent beyond that contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases the product with the ordinary knowledge about the product's characteristics common to the community of consumers." 185 Even if the seller (manufacturer) has exercised all reasonable care in the preparation and manufacturing of a product, a person selling, leasing, or otherwise putting a defective or unreasonably dangerous product in the stream of commerce is subject to liability. 186 However actions claiming design-defect require that the "party making the claim must establish that the manufacturer or seller failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances in designing the product or in providing the warnings or instructions." 187 207 The court addressed the unfairness argument by stating that "alleged misrepresentations were drafted by the brand-name manufacturer and merely repeated . . . by the generic manufacturer." 208 The court reasoned that the special sameness requirement gave them the ability to consider the innovator liability argument. 209 The court cited to the unique relationship between the brand-name and generic drugs. 210 The Alabama Supreme Court reheard the case in September 2013. 211 After rehearing, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed their previous ruling in a 6-3 decision. Many argued against this decision claiming it is "a basic of products liability, it's in the Restatement of Torts … that a manufacturer is responsible [only] for the products it makes . . . ." 212 Unfortunately, there are several cases in their favor; as of January 2014, "77 cases [said] name-brand manufacturers don't owe any duty to people who never took their products [and] [s]ix federal appeals courts have ruled that way." 213 
